The catastrophic economic damage caused by the 2008 financial crisis is unprecedented and caught many market participants by surprise. It also raises the question: what is the role of institutional investors in the banking industry? In this paper, we investigate this under-researched area and provide evidence that grey institutions (i.e. banks and insurance companies) have more information about banks' risk exposure to securitization than do independent institutions (e.g. investment companies and public pension funds) as they shy away from banks that issuing riskier securitization deals before the crisis. We also find that the trading of grey institutions before the crisis can predict high-exposure banks' abnormal returns around the Lehman Bankruptcy and is related to such banks' operating performance during the crisis period.
Introduction
Institutional investing in the stocks of banks has increased dramatically for the past decade in U.S.; the median institutional ownership in bank holding companies (BHCs) has increased from around 10% in 2001 to more than 40% in 2013. However, systematic evidence regarding their roles in the banking industry is scarce despite the fact that banks provide important services in the economy and the governance of banks is more important than ever since the 2008 financial crisis (Becht et al. (2011) ). In U.S. alone, this crisis wiped out over 50% market capitalization, led to drastic deterioration in financial institutions' balance sheets and fire sales due to the run on the shadow banking system. The catastrophic collapse of subprime mortgage securitization market raises the important question on how securitization affects lenders' screening incentives. Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010) empirically examine this question and conclude that the screening standard of subprime mortgages is adversely affected by securitization practices.
With hindsight, it is obvious that some banks had taken excessive risk prior to the crisis that led to their subsequent collapses and tremendous losses of equity value. It then raises the questions how much institutional investors have anticipated this event and what role they played in the banking industry prior to the 2008 financial crisis. In this paper, we investigate these questions to shed light on the potential for institutional investors to be bank monitors. Empirical literature has documented their monitoring role in the manufacturing sectors. For example, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) show that institutions with large ownership positions often have access to board members and senior managers. Using invested firms' decisions on mergers and acquisitions, Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) show that only concentrated holdings by independent long-term institutions are related to post-merger performance and make withdrawal of bad bids more likely. They also find that these institutions make long-term portfolio adjustments rather than trading for short-term gain and only sell in advance of very bad outcomes.
We follow the spirits of Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) in this study, but with an important twist to fit our purpose. We postulate that grey institutions, i.e., banks and insurance companies, have more information on BHCs with high exposure to the risk associated with securitization activities than do independent institutions, i.e. pension funds, investment companies and advisers. Banks are in the same business with other banks, they should know other banks better.
Insurance companies are active participants in the securitization business by being the investors of these products or the insurers of mortgage backed securities. Both roles played by insurance companies suggest that they have the incentives to monitor banks. However, the premium received from insuring these securitized products can also taint their incentives. The case of AIG is a gruesome example. Nonetheless, in any case, these grey institutions are likely to have more information than independent institutions through their own business lines.
On the other hand, given institutional investors' experience and expertise in investing, independent institutions also have incentives to produce information. Extant literature also documents evidence that institutional trading is motived by the skills and information they possess. For example, Yan and Zhang (2009) find that stocks experiencing the largest increase in short-term institutional holdings have significantly higher earnings surprises and earnings announcement abnormal returns over the subsequent four quarters than stocks experiencing the largest decrease in short-term institutional holdings. Given the complex incentives of grey institutions and the normal investment incentives of independent investors, it is indeed an empirical issue, how they have traded invested banks prior to the financial crisis.
The 2008 crisis is definitely qualified to be a very bad outcome. To protect their investments, better informed institutional investors regardless of their investment horizons should reduce their holdings of banks that have a high potential of collapsing. Using BHCs' reported securitization level in FR Y-9C, we find that institutional investors started to reduce their investments in BHCs at least 4 quarters before the crisis hit and the selling is more pronounced for BHCs with a high exposure to securitization. The empirical results confirm our prediction: grey institutions reduced their holdings more in BHCs with high exposure to securitization than independent institutions before the crisis. The results are robust even after controlling for heterogeneity among BHCs and potential endogeneity issues.
The securitization information obtained in FR Y-9C only shows the quantity of involvement in securitization. But the volume of activities does not necessarily translate into worse quality of deals. In this paper, we utilize a unique dataset, BBx data TM , provided by BlackBox Logic to formally examine deal quality. covers over 90% of the U.S non-agency residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) market. It contains more than 7,400 deals, 21 million loans, and over 740 million remittance records dating back to 1999. The coverage includes all the mortgage market sectors, i.e., Jumbo A, Prime, Subprime, and Alt A deals. To match BHCs with deals they issued, we use the deal identifications provided in BBx Data to look up each deal's prospectus (Form 424B5) in SEC EDGAR and find the issuer for the deal from the prospectus. We are able to identify 2,152 deals whose issuers are in our BHC sample over the period of 2001-2013.
When we add BBX deal quality measures and confine ourselves to only issuing BHCs, we find that grey institutions tilt their investment towards BHCs that issue safer securitization deals prior to the crisis. Specifically, we find that grey institutions prefer BHCs that issue deals with higher documentation level, higher proportion of owner-occupied properties, and lower combined loan-to-values (CLTV) over the four quarters leading up to the crisis; they also tilt their portfolios away from BHCs that issue deals with missing FICO or combined CLTV information. In contrast, independent institutions seemed to prefer BHCs that issue riskier deals;
for example, deals with lower documentation levels, lower proportion of prime mortgages, and smaller proportion of owner-occupied properties over the same pre-crisis period. The ownership of independent institutions also loads positively on deals with no FICOs or CLTVs.
Finally, to further test whether the trading is information driven, we investigate whether the trading of institutions before crisis can predict BHCs' stock performance and operating performance during the crisis. We perform an event study on the Lehman Bankruptcy. We find that the trading of both grey institutions and independent institutions before the crisis have significant power in predicting BHCs' event day returns, but grey institutions does a much better job in predicting event returns for high-exposure BHCs. Furthermore, we find no evidence of price reversal for high-exposure BHCs based on the trading of grey institutions. The evidence lends more support to the conjecture that the trading of grey institutions is driven by their better information instead of negative fund flows they experience before the crisis. We also find some evidence that the pre-crisis trading of grey institutions can predict high-exposure BHCs' profitability during the crisis.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first paper systematically examining the role of institutional investors in the banking industry surrounding the 2008 crisis. The closest paper that we can find is by Cziraki (2013) who uses bank executives' trading in their own banks' stocks to infer their knowledge about the impendent crisis and finds that insiders of banks with a high exposure to the housing market sell 39% more equity than insiders of low-exposure banks. Unlike Cziraki (2013) who uses the correlation between the returns on the Barclays index of BBB-rated collateralized mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and the stock returns of the banks during July 2007 -December 2008 to proxy a bank's exposure to the housing market, we use a more direct measure-BHCs' reported securitization level in FR Y-9C. We also obtain specific deal information in BBx dataset and formally examine the FICO score, combined loan-to-value ratio, documentation level, mortgage owner status, and proportion of prime mortgages in deals issued by BHCs.
In general, this paper also contributes to literature in the role of institutional investors in the financial markets. As Becht et al. (2011) point out, the evidence of shareholder oversight in the banking industry is scarce albeit its importance. We fill the gap by documenting the trading patterns of institutional investors prior to the 2008 Crisis. We show that institutional investors, particularly insurance companies and banks, are concerned about the subprime mortgage securitization practices in some BHCs prior to the 2008 crisis. Their votes with their feet suggest that these grey institutions oppose such risk-taking behaviors of some BHCs, which subsequently failed catastrophically during the crisis. However, the lack of evidence from independent investors and the magnitude of trading effects from grey institutions suggest that it is unlikely to delegate a monitoring role to institutional investors in the banking industry. Our analysis, thus, also adds to the literature on governance through trading, such as Edmans and Manso (2011) and Chang, Lin, Ma (2014) that trading of institutional investors can serve as a commitment device that punish or reward firms making good decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We describe our date sources and definitions of key variables in Section 2, and provide descriptive statistics and univariate analysis in Section 3. Our main empirical results are provided in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Data Sources and Variable Construction

Sample Selection and BHC Characteristics
To (1) Liquidity risk. We measure a BHC's balance sheet liquidity by the ratio of liquid assets over total assets (LIQ).
(2) Credit risk or loan quality. We compute the sum of loans past due 90 days or more and loans not accruing for bad loans, scaled by total assets (LQLT).
(3) Capital adequacy. We use total equity capital over total assets (EQT).
(4) Profitability. We use return on assets (PRF).
(5) Insolvency risk. We use Z-score to capture a BHC's insolvency risk; it equals the return on assets plus the capital asset ratio, + ⁄ . It measures the number of standard deviations that profits must fall to drive a BHC into insolvency. It's essentially a measure of the distance to default for a given BHC.
(6) Efficiency. We use the ratio of noninterest expenditures to total assets (EFF).
Following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) , we also collect the following measures for our sample BHCs:
(7) Reliance on off-balance-sheet activity. We use the ratio of noninterest income over total net income (NONINC).
(8) Time-varying risk preferences. We use BHC's derivative trading over assets (DT) and BHC's derivative hedging over assets (DH).
To measure securitization-related activities, we estimate the following measures:
(9) Private MBS (PMBS). It's calculated as the total value of private-label mortgage-backed securities held in both trading and investment portfolios.
(10) Mortgage securitization. We measure a BHC's mortgage securitization activities by the sum of mortgage and home equity lines securitized over total assets (SCT_MGG).
(11) Aggregate asset securitization. To measure a BHC's aggregate exposure to asset securitization, we use the sum of all securitized assets over total assets, included asset categories are securitized family residential loans, home equity lines, credit card receivables, and other consumer loans, and commercial & industrial loans (SCT_All).
We also include the logarithm of BHC assets (Size) as total assets have been shown to be a proxy for bank diversification potential (Brewer, 1989) . Larger banks may also be redeemed safer by investors due to "too big to fail". Lastly, we add two BHC stock performance measure.
QRET is for compounded stock return over the quarter using BHCs' daily return data; QVOL is quarterly return volatility, calculated as the variance of daily returns over the quarter. We winsorize variables at the one and 99 percentile to mitigate the impact of outliers.
Institutional Ownership
We collect institutional holding data from CHGIO_Total, CHGIO_Grey, and CHGIO_Indp are corresponding trading measures. They are defined as the change in institutional ownership from previous quarter for a BHC.
Deal Quality Measures
We obtain the deal quality measures of securitized mortgages from provided by BlackBox Logic. covers over 90% of the U.S non-agency residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) market. It contains more than 7,400 deals, 21 million loans, and over 740 million remittance records dating back to 1999. The coverage includes all the mortgage market sectors, i.e., Jumbo A, Prime, Subprime, and Alt A deals. To match BHCs with deals they issued, we use the deal identifications provided in BBx Data to look up each deal's prospectus (Form 424B5) in SEC EDGAR and find the issuer for the deal from the prospectus.
We are able to identify 2,152 deals whose issuers are in our BHC sample over the period of
2001-2013.
We collect average issue balance and deal issue year as control variables, and the following five different deal quality measures from BBx Data:
(1) Average FICO score for all loans in the deal (FICO); (2) Average documentation level for all loans in the deal (DOC). For each mortgage, BBx reports one of the documentation status, "Full Documentation (FD)", "Low Documentation (LD)", "No Documentation (ND)", "Reduced Documentation (RD)" and "Unknown (UN)". We assign a value of 1 to mortgages with ND or UN, a value of 2 to mortgages with RD or LD, and a value of 3 to mortgages with FD. We then compute the average documentation level of all mortgages included in one deal as the deal's average documentation level.
(3) Combined loan-to-value (CLTV). BBx reports the ratio of all loan amounts on the property at the time of origination to the property value at loan origination for each mortgage. We compute the mean value of all mortgages include in one deal as deal's average CLTV.
(4) Proportion of prime mortgages in the deal (LSEC). BBx reports the credit sector each mortgage belongs, including "Alt-A (AA)", "Prime (PR)", "Subprime (SP)", and "Unknown (UN)". We assign a value of 1 to mortgages with UN or SP, a value of 2 to mortgages with AA, and a value of 3 to mortgages with PR. Then we compute the average value of all mortgages in one deal as the deal's average loan sector, the higher the value the higher portion of prime mortgages in the deal.
(5) Property occupancy status. BBx provides occupancy types: "Non Owner Occupied", "Other", "Owner Occupied", "Second Home", "Unknown" and "Vacant". We assign a value of 1 to mortgages recorded as "Owner Occupied" and a value of 0 to the rest mortgages. We then compute the average value of all mortgages in one deal as the deal's average owner-occupancy. The higher the value, the more properties are owner-occupied in the deal. has 0.4% return on assets, and keeps around 9% of asset value in equity capital.
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive Statistics for BHC Characteristics
On average, BHCs spend 2% of assets in noninterest expense. Nonperforming loans, estimated by the sum of loans over 90 days late and loans not accruing, take up around 1.2% for an average BHC. Z-score has a mean 40.97, suggesting that the profit must fall at least 41 standard deviations to drive an average BHC into insolvency. The distribution of derivatives used for trading and hedging are highly skewed, and indicates that not every BHC is equally active in using derivatives. For an average BHC, the noninterest income accounts for around 18.4% of its total net income; and the value of private-label mortgage-backed securities accounts for around 0.6% of its total assets. The securitization-related measures are also skewed,
indicating not every BHC is equally involved in securitization. Average quarterly return for sample BHCs is 0.025 with a standard deviation of 0.001.
On average, institutional investors hold 29.4% of sample BHCs' shares. Independent institutions seem to have a greater ownership in BHCs than grey institutions; but both have meaningful existence in BHCs.
In Panel B of Table 1 , we seek to understand the differences in characteristics between
BHCs with high exposure to asset securitization and BHCs with low exposure to asset securitization. To do so, we aggregate sample BHCs' reported asset securitization (SCT_ALL) over the whole sample period, and then we treat BHCs with non-zero aggregated asset securitization as Securitizing BHCs and those with zero aggregated asset securitization as Nonsecuritizing BHCs. We then perform a T-test and Wilcoxon rank test of the values of various BHC characteristics.
As we can see, Securitizing BHCs are larger in size, hold a slightly bigger percentage of liquid assets, are more profitable, spend more on noninterest expense, and hold more bad loans, and have smaller distance to insolvency than Non-securitizing Securitizing BHCs are much more active in using derivatives for trading and hedging purposes than Non-securitizing BHCs.
Securitizing BHCs attribute a greater percentage of their net income to non-interest-generating activities and hold a greater private-label MBS in their portfolios than do Non-securitizing BHCs. Not surprisingly, Issuer BHCs also have higher mortgage/all asset securitization level as well as higher charge-offs on securitized assets. Over our sample period, Securitizing BHCs also have lower return volatility than Non-securitizing BHCs but the two groups do not seem to have different stock returns over the sample period. In terms of institutional investment, Securitizing
BHCs have significantly higher institutional ownership than Non-Securitizing BHCs; the same holds for both grey institutions and independent institutions.
Descriptive Statistics for Deal Characteristics
We present summary statistics for securitization deal related measures in Table 2 . We provide mean, median, standard deviation, 25 th percentile and 75 th percentile for each variable.
Along with each variable, we also provide the number of deals that has available information to compute the statistic. Even though we are able to match 2,152 deals in total, some deals are missing one or more quality measures we use here.
Grand mean of FICO scores is 700 with a median of 719. Combined loan-to-value has a mean of 79.46%, which tells us the average loan amounts on the deal property at the time of origination is about 80% of the property value at loan origination. Average documentation level is 1.8, indicating that an average borrower in these deals provide some kind of income 
Empirical Results
Institutional Trading in BHCs prior to the 2008 Financial Crisis
We postulate that institutional investors, particularly grey institutions, with their expertise in investment and experience in the securitization markets may have some knowledge about the impending crisis and revise their assessment of investment prospect in BHCs. Following
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) The results are reported in Table 3 . 4 The first two columns of Table 3 report the levels of institutional ownership for grey and independent institutions respectively. The securitization exposure variable is PMBS-the total value of private-label mortgage-backed securities held in both trading and investment portfolios over total assets. Grey institutions appear to avoid investments in BHCs with high PMBS trading activities indicated by the significantly negative coefficient on SCTt in column 1, Table 3 . Grey institutions did not reduce holdings throughout the pre-crisis period as all pre-crisis dummies are insignificant, despite their relatively higher levels of ownership in non-PMBS trading banks than their ownership in high PBMS banks. The significant negative coefficient on SCTt and pre-crisis dummy for the third quarter in 2006 indicates that grey institutions reduce their holdings in high PMBS exposure banks four quarters prior to the crisis unfolded.
In contrast, the significantly positive coefficient on SCTt in column (2) suggests that independent institutional investors preferred high PMBS trading banks. They also reduced holdings in BHCs during the pre-crisis period. However, such reductions are general and not specifically aiming high PMBS exposure banks. The distinct differences in ownership pattern between grey and independent institutions indicate that both types of institutions had unfavorable information on BHCs, but the concerns of grey institutions were more specific and only restricted to high PMBS exposure banks.
Columns (3) to (6) focus on whether BHCs engage in securitization activities by using a mortgage securitization dummy (MGGD) in Columns (3) and (4); and an all securitization dummy (ALLD) in Columns (5) and (6). The results are very similar, so we mainly discuss the findings using MGGD. 5 With the exception of no significant preference between securitizing and non-securitizing banks by both types of institutions, the results in Columns (3) to (6) Several control variables that turn out to be statistically significant for both types of institutional investors also have their expected signs. Regardless of grey or independent, institutional ownership is positively related with equity ratio and BHC size but negatively related with stock return volatility. Following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), we also include derivative trading and derivative hedging to proxy for BHC's time-varying risk preferences. Institutional 5 When we turn to the last two columns, we find that two of the interaction terms between total asset securitization and pre-crisis dummies for independent institutions are negative and significant, but they are smaller in magnitude than those for grey institutions. In addition, this securitization measure is very general and not specific to mortgage securitization. The findings are still in line with our main conclusions that grey institutions reduced holdings more specifically than independent institutions prior to the crisis.
investors also tilt their investments away from BHCs with high derivative trading. Grey institutions show preference in BHCs holding more liquid assets (LIQt-1) and with higher efficiency (EFFt-1; noninterest expenses over total assets), but independent institutions prefer BHCs with higher prior quarterly stock returns (QRETt-1)
Addressing Endogeneity and Reverse Causality Concerns
A few concerns may arise for the aforementioned relationship as a BHC's decision to securitize could be determinedly endogenously. For example, the institution-BHC matching might be nonrandom; some BHCs' decision to securitize may be affected by the percentage of their shares held by institutional investors; or the difference in institutional ownership between securitizing and non-securitizing BHCs may reflect other unobservable BHC characteristics rather than securitization. In this subsection, we provide a series of robustness checks to address this concern. For this subsection, we confine our sample to the four quarters immediately before the crisis, i.e., 2006Q3 to 2007Q2.
Our first robustness test addresses the concern that BHCs are heterogeneous. As Table 1 shows, BHCs that choose to involve in securitization are very different from those that do not.
These different characteristics could be the main drivers that affect institutional ownership. To control for this possibility, we use propensity score matching (PSM). PSM allows us to examine institutional ownership of the securitizing BHCs in comparison with a matched control sample of non-securitizing BHCs.
To implement PSM, we first utilize probit regressions with one of our securitization dummies (PMBS, SCT_MGGD and SCT_ALLD) being the dependent variable. The regressions can help us to identify BHC characteristics that contribute to a BHC's probability of being 20 involved in the securitization activities. We run the probit regressions with all of our BHC risk measures with quarter fixed effect. We then calculate each BHC's propensity score based on the probability that a BHC with given characteristics actively involved in securitization. With the computed propensity score, we match securitizing BHCs with non-securitizing BHCs (using 10 nearest neighbors and matching within a 0.01 caliper). Lastly, we implement univariate tests to compare the difference in mean institutional ownership between the treated and the matched sample for each of the 4 quarters leading up to the crisis as well as the whole pre-crisis period.
We report the univariate test results in Panel A of Table 4 . 6 The results show that BHCs with high exposure to mortgage securitization and aggregate asset securitization experienced greater decline in institutional ownership before the crisis than did matched low-exposure BHCs. In contrast, there's no significant difference in independent institutional ownership between the two groups prior to the crisis. Matching based on private-label MBS does not generate significant results, but the difference is negative for grey institutions before the crisis.
To further address the concern of endogeneity and reverse causality, we resort to instrumental variable (IV) regressions. Admittedly, it is challenging to find valid instrumental variables based on economic theory that predict a BHC's securitization decision but not its institutional ownership. Nevertheless, we choose five macroeconomic variables as our excluded instrumental variables: real disposable personal income, average number of households over the quarter, average number of marriages, and the average growth rate in the number of mortgage applications, and total deposits the BHC holds. Intuitively, we expect higher disposable income, higher number of households and number of marriages and faster growth in mortgage applications and lower deposits available would put more pressure on BHCs to securitize assets to meet the liquidity needs and loan demand.
We report the second-stage regression results in Panel B of Table 4 . From Column 1 through Column 3, we investigate the institutional ownership of grey institutions and from Column 4 through Column 6, we investigate the institutional ownership of independent institutions. The results again confirm that grey institutions significantly reduce their investment in high-securitization exposure BHCs as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficients on all securitization measures in the first three columns; in stark contrast, none of the predicted securitization measures turns out significant for independent institutions. In addition, the overidentification tests cannot reject the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term but is correlated with securitization measures.
Institutional Ownership and Deal Quality
In Section 4.1, we have shown that institutional investors reduce their holdings in BHCs at least 4 quarters before the crisis hit. In particularly, the reduction of grey institution holdings is more profound in BHCs that report higher levels of asset securitization or PMBS trading on their balance sheet. However, high securitization level doesn't necessarily lead to high risk or deterioration of balance sheet for a BHC if risk is appropriately controlled when securitizing mortgages. To further capture BHCs' risk exposure to securitization activities, we re-examine the institutional ownership regressions by including mortgage securitization deal quality. The results are reported in Table 5 .
The results in Table 5 show that grey institutions significantly reduced holdings among though the independent institutions correctly anticipated the hit of the crisis, they were unable to precisely identify safer BHCs from the BHC universe.
Event Study of Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy and Ex Post Profitability
Our results so far suggest that institutional investors prefer to invest in safer BHCs, and they are also fairly informed about the BHCs' situation. They reduce their holdings in BHCs prior to the crisis and the reduction is more concentrated in high-exposure BHCs. We also establish that grey institutions with their stronger business ties with the BHCs as well as their experience in similar business lines to BHCs show greater concern than independent institutions.
In this subsection, we provide additional tests on whether grey institutions indeed have more information about BHCs than do independent institutions.
We investigate whether institutional trading over the four quarters leading up to the crisis can predict the BHCs' abnormal returns for the 3-day window around Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. We take Lehman Brothers bankruptcy as the one of the clearest signals of the housing market meltdown and excessive risk-taking in securitization deals. If institutional investors have anticipated the crisis and are able to identify the BHCs that were more aggressive in securitizing assets, their trading in these BHCs should predict the BHCs' stock performance around the event. To increase the precision of BHCs actively involved in questionable securitization practices, we only use PMBS (private-label MBS) trading as our securitization proxy. The general securitization measures contain more noise and do not provide enough discrimination power for the stock return analysis, therefore, we do not report the results using the general measures (the results are available upon request).
Panel A in Table 6 In Table 6 further confirms that the of grey institutions before the crisis is driven by the information they had instead of negative fund flows or liquidity need they were facing.
As an additional robustness check, we also examine BHCs' operating performance (ROA) during crisis in Table 7 . Again, the trades of grey institutions on high exposure BHCs have better predicted power than those of independent institutions. However, grey institutions do not appear to know low exposure BHCs better than independent institutions as some estimates of grey institutional trades for low exposure banks are significantly negative. In any case, the findings of stock performance and operating performance confirms that grey institutions have more information than independent institutions regarding high exposure BHCs prior to the crisis.
Conclusion
In this paper, we test whether institutional investors have better information about the BHCs they invest. We use the 2008 financial crisis as a major event and examine how institutional investors trade in BHCs around the crisis. We divide BHCs into high-exposure BHCs and low-exposure BHCs based on their involvement in securitization. We supplement BHCs' aggregate securitization level from FR Y-9C with detailed securitization deal quality measures from BBx Data, which contains more than 7,400 private label mortgage securitized deals.
We find that grey institutions can better identify high-exposure BHCs and reduce their holdings more in such BHCs than independent institutions during the four quarters prior to the crisis. When we confine the analysis to only securitizing BHCs, we find that grey institutions prefer BHCs that issued deals with higher documentation level, higher proportion of owneroccupies properties, and lower loan-value during the pre-crisis period. On the contrary, independent institutions tilt their investment towards BHCs that issue riskier securitization deals over the same period.
Lastly, the trading of both grey institutions and independent institutions immediately before the crisis have significant power in predicting BHCs' event day returns surrounding the Lehman Bankruptcy, but grey institutions does a much better job in predicting event returns for high-exposure BHCs. Overall, our findings suggest that it is unlikely to rely on independent institutions to provide information on BHCs. Although, through their trades, grey institutions had revealed perverse information on some high exposure BHCs prior to the crisis. The magnitude does not appear to be economically strong enough as a pre-warning signal. In sum, our analysis demonstrate that there were concerned institutions regarding the risk-taking behaviors of BHCs prior to the crisis. However, it is not systematic among institutions to delegate them a monitoring role in the banking industry.
BHC-level variables
We obtain consolidated financial information of bank holding companies (BHCs) from the FR Y-9C reports from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (FRB Chicago). Federal Reserve Bank of New York provides PERMCO_RSSD links from January 1, 1990 to September 30, 2012 7 . We use this linking table to collect PERMCOs for our sample BHCs and then we obtain stock return information of BHCs from CRSP. The expressions in parentheses denote the corresponding variable names in the FR Y-9C.
 Size is natural logarithm of total assets (BHCK2170).  LIQ measures a BHC's balance sheet liquidity, it's calculated as liquid assets over total assets. Liquid assets equals the sum of Fed funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell (BHCK1350), securities held to maturity (BHCK1754), and available for sale securities (BHCK1773) for the period up to 2001Q4. For the period starting from 2002Q1, liquid assets equals the sum of BHCKC225, BHCK1754, and BHCK1773. From the first quarter of 2002, we use BHCKC225 to account for Fed funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell.  PRF measures a BHC's profitability, it's calculated as net income (BHCK4340) over total assets (BHCK2170).  EQT is equity ratio, calculated as equity capital (BHCK3210) over total assets (BHCK2170).  EFF is BHC efficiency measures, it's calculated as noninterest expenses over total assets (BHCK2170).  DT is total gross notional amount of derivative contracts held for trading, obtained adding the values of interest rate contracts (BHCKA126), foreign exchange contracts (BHCKA127), equity derivative contracts (BHCK8723), and commodity and other contracts (BHCK8724) over total assets.  DH is total value of derivatives used for hedging purposes (sum of BHCK8725, BHCK8726, BHCK8727, and BHCK8728) over total assets.
 NONINC is the ratio of noninterest income (BHCK4079) over the sum of noninterest and interest income (BHCK4079+BHCK4107).
 LQLT measures a BHC's loan quality, it's calculated as the sum of loans past due 90 days or more (BHCK5525) and loans not accruing (BHCK5526) over total assets.  PMBS, private MBS: the total value of private-label mortgage-backed securities held in both trading and investment portfolios; it excludes mortgage-backed securities that are either issued or guaranteed by government sponsored enterprises. It is calculated as the sum of BHCK1709, BHCK1733, BHCK1713, BHCK1736 and BHCK3536.
 SCT_MGG, the amount of mortgage securitized over total assets. The amount of mortgage securitized is obtained by adding outstanding principal balance of assets sold and securitized with recourse or other seller-provided credit enhancements -home equity lines (BHCKB706) and 1-4 family residential loans (BHCKB705).
 SCT_ALL, the sum of all securitized assets over total assets. All securitized assets value is obtained by adding the values of outstanding principal balance of assets sold and securitized with recourse or other seller-provided credit enhancements from the following six categories: 1-4 family residential loans (BHCKB705), home equity lines (BHCKB706), credit card receivables (BHCKB707), auto loans (BHCKB708), other consumer loans (BHCKB709), and commercial and industrial loans (BHCKB710).  Z-score. It equals the return on assets (PRF) plus the capital asset ratio (EQT) divided by the standard deviation of asset returns. It captures the number of standard deviations that profits must fall to derive a BHC into insolvency.  QRET is compounded stock return over the quarter using daily return data.  QVOL is quarterly return volatility, calculated as the variance of daily returns over the quarter.
Institutional ownership measures
We obtain institutional holding data from Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13f) The Thomson sets are available on WRDS as part of the Thomson Financial Network (TFN).
Thomson Financial Spectrum classifies institutions into five types: 1) banks; 2) insurance companies; 3) investment companies and their managers; 4) independent investment advisers; and 5) others (pension funds, endowments, etc.). Following Chen, Harford, and Li (2007), we classify types 3 and 4 as well as public pension funds from type 5 as independent institutions; and types 1 and 2 as well as the remaining institutions from type 5 as grey institutions.
 IO_Total, total institutional ownership. It's calculated as the ratio of a BHC's total shares held by 13f investors over the BHC's total shares outstanding.
 IO_Grey, total institutional ownership from grey institutions. It's calculated as the ratio of a BHC's total shares held by grey institutions over the BHC's total shares outstanding.
 IO_Indp, total institutional ownership from independent institutions. It's calculated as the ratio of a BHC's total shares held by independent institutions over the BHC's total shares outstanding.
 CHGIO_Total, the change in total institutional ownership from previous quarter for the BHC.  CHGIO_Grey, the change in grey institutional ownership from previous quarter for the BHC.  CHGIO_Indp, the change in independent institutional ownership from previous quarter for the BHC.
Deal quality measures
We collect various quality measures of securitized mortgage deals from BBx database provided by BlackBox Logic.
includes more than 7,400 deals, 21 million loans and over 740 million remittance records dating back to 1999.
 FICO: the average FICO score for all loans in the deal. If a deal doesn't have FICO score information, we assign a value of 0 to the FICO score of for such deals.
 MissFICO. Dummy variable that takes 1 for deals with missing FICO score and 0 otherwise.  DOC: average documentation level for all loans in the deal. For each mortgage, BBx reports one of the documentation status, "Full Documentation (FD)", "Low Documentation (LD)", "No Documentation (ND)", "Reduced Documentation (RD)" and "Unknown (UN)". We assign a value of 1 to mortgages with ND or UN, a value of 2 to mortgages with RD or LD, and a value of 3 to mortgages with FD. We then compute the average documentation level of all mortgages included in one deal as the deal's average documentation level.  CLTV: combined loan-to-value. BBx reports the ratio of all loan amounts on the property at the time of origination to the property value at loan origination for each mortgage. We compute the mean value of all mortgages include in one deal as deal's average CLTV. If a deal doesn't have CLTV information, we assign a 100% CLTV to such deals.
 MissCLTV. Dummy variable that takes 1 for deals with no CLTV information and 0 otherwise.  LSEC: proportion of prime mortgages in the deal. BBx reports the credit sector each mortgage belongs, including "Alt-A (AA)", "Prime (PR)", "Subprime (SP)", and "Unknown (UN)". We assign a value of 1 to mortgages with UN or SP, a value of 2 to mortgages with AA, and a value of 3 to mortgages with PR. Then we compute the average value of all mortgages in one deal as the deal's average loan sector, the higher the value the higher portion of prime mortgages in the deal.  Owner: owner occupancy status. BBx provides occupancy types: "Non Owner Occupied", "Other", "Owner Occupied", "Second Home", "Unknown" and "Vacant".
We assign a value of 1 to mortgages recorded as "Owner Occupied" and a value of 0 to the rest mortgages. We then compute the average value of all mortgages in one deal as the deal's average owner-occupancy. The higher the value, the more properties are owner-occupied in the deal.  Issue year: the calendar year the deal was formed.  Issue Balance: the average issuing balance for the deal.
Appendix B: List of Public Pension Funds
These public pension funds are collectively identified in Cremers and Nair (2005) 
Appendix D. Descriptive Statistic for Instrument Variables
This table reports the descriptive statistics for instrument variables over the pre-crisis period.
DPINC is quarterly real disposable personal income; NHOUS is the average number of households over the quarter in thousands; NMARR is average number of marriages during the quarter in thousands; and GRMGGN is the average growth rate in the number of mortgage applications over the quarter. All the four variables are estimated from data series reported in HIS Global Insight. Loans is total loans over total assets, calculated as BHCK2122/BHCK2170; Deposits is total deposits over total assets, calculated as the sum of BHDM6631, BHDM6636, BHFN6631, BHFN6636 over BHCK217. Data for these two variables is from FR Y-9C. Deal quality measures are from BBx Data. FICO, is the average FICO score for all the mortgages in the deal. DOC is the average documentation level for all the mortgages in the deal. BBx reports documentation level for each mortgage: "Full Documentation (FD)", "Low Documentation (LD)", "No Documentation (ND)", "Reduced Documentation (RD)" and "Unknown (UN)". We assign a value of 1 to mortgages with ND or UN, a value of 2 to mortgages with RD or LD, and a value of 3 to mortgages with FD. DOC is the mean value of all mortgage documentation indicators in a deal. CLTV, is the average combined loan-to-value for all mortgages in a deal. LSEC is the indicator of proportion of prime mortgages in the deal. ). BBx reports the credit sector each mortgage belongs, including "Alt-A (AA)", "Prime (PR)", "Subprime (SP)", and "Unknown (UN)". We assign a value of 1 to mortgages with UN or SP, a value of 2 to mortgages with AA, and a value of 3 to mortgages with PR. CLTV is then computed as the average of these numbers for all the mortgages in a deal. Owner is an indicator of occupancy status of the mortgages in a deal. BBx provides occupancy types: "Non Owner Occupied", "Other", "Owner Occupied", "Second Home", "Unknown" and "Vacant". We assign a value of 1 to mortgages recorded as "Owner Occupied" and a value of 0 to the rest mortgages. Owner is then computed as the average for all mortgages in one deal. Issue balance, the average amount of loan principal outstanding at the time of deal issuance. We presents the results from regressions of different institutional holdings on BHC risk measures, dummy variables for the 4 quarters leading up to the crisis, one of our securitization level measures, as well as the interactions of securitization measure and dummy variables. See Appendix A for variable definitions. We obtain BHC securitization information from Y-9C. Private-label MBS (PMBS) is the total value of private-label mortgage-backed securities held in both trading and investment portfolios (scaled by total assets); this excludes mortgage backed securities that are either issued or guaranteed by government sponsored enterprises. The reported asset categories are 1-4 Family Residential Mortgage Loans, Home Equity Lines, Commercial and Industrial Loans, Credit Card, Auto, and Other Consumer Loans. We create two dummy variables to identify BHCs that are active securitizers: SCT_MGGD takes value of 1 if a BHC's sum of mortgage and home equity lines securitized over total assets is greater than 0 and 0 otherwise; SCT_ALLD takes value of 1 if a BHC's the sum of all securitized assets over total assets is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise. The first two columns report the results with PMBS being the main securitization measure; the middle two columns use MGGD as the main securitization measure, and the last two columns report the results with ALLD being the main securitization measure. We cluster standard error at BHC level to allow for intragroup correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
(1) In Panel A, we report the mean difference in institutional ownership between BHCs with high exposure to securitization and BHCs with low exposure to securitization using Propensity Score Matching. In the first stage, we run Probit regression with one of the securitization measure dummies being the department variable, and all our control variables as independent variables along with date fixed effect. The three securitization dummies we use are: PMBSD, equals 1 if a BHC reports nonzero PMBS and 0 otherwise, SCT_MGGD, equals 1 if a BHC reports nonzero mortgage securitization and 0 otherwise; SCT_ALLD, equals 1 if a BHC reports nonzero aggregate asset securitization and 0 otherwise. We then conduct propensity score matching (PSM) based on the results we obtain from Probit regressions, using the nearest-neighbor matching with n=10 and a caliper of 0.01. We conduct mean difference t-tests on grey institutional ownership and independent institutional ownership between the treated sample and matched sample for each of the 4 quarters prior to crisis as well as the whole year prior to crisis. In this table, we rerun the regressions of institutional ownership on various deal quality measures and control variables for grey institutions and independent institutions separately. Deal quality measures are from BBx Data. We find each deal's prospectus in Edgar and identify the deals whose issuers are our sample bank holding companies. FICO is the average FICO score for all mortgages in one deal; DOC is the average documentation level for all loans in one deal; CLTV is the average combined loan-to-value for all mortgages in one deal; LSEC is the proportion of prime mortgages in the deal; Owner is the proportion of owner-occupied properties in the deal. For some deals, FICO information is missing, when this happens, we assign a value of 0 to such deals' FICOs and also create a dummy variable (MissFICO), which takes value of one for deals missing FICO and zero otherwise. For some deals, CLTV information is missing, in this case, we assign a value of 100 to these deals' CLTVs and also create a dummy variable (MissCLTV), which takes value of one for deals with no CLTV and zero otherwise. In Column 1 through Column 5, the dependent variable is aggregate ownership from grey institutions; in Column 6 through Column 10, the dependent variable is aggregate ownership from independent institutions. We cluster standard error at BHC level to allow for intragroup correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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